

# Programming Languages and Technical Disruption

#### **Ben Zorn**

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Microsoft Research, Redmond





#### This talk is about...

#### Why Zika Is This Year's Scary Virus

It is "spreading explosively" in the Americas and may be the next public health emergency.

## Stability

FEB 13, 2013 @ 09:37 AM 135,574 VIEWS

#### Microsoft's Excel Might Be Th Dangerous Software On The F



#### Tim Worstall, CONTRIBUTOR

I have opinions about economics, finance and public policy. **FULL**Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.

No, really, it's possible that Microsoft's Excel is the modangerous software on the planet. Yes, more dangerous

rogue code running a nuclear power plant, than the http://www.bbc.com/news/business-3432477 that was deliberately sent off to sabotage Iran's nuclear

program, worse, even, than whatever rent in the fabric of space time led to the invention of Lolcats. Really, that serious.

http://onforb.es/1RRZPhg



By Russell Hotten Business reporter, BBC News

① 10 December 2015 Business



## Well-being



Trust






### RiSE – Research in Software Engineering







#### What's New in Computer Science?



Where are the Programming Languages?





# Presenting **DeepPLDI**:

The First PLDI paper written by an RNN

- Data: 7 years of PLDI 2007-2015, 304 files, 25Mb of text
- HW: Intel i7, Nvidia GeForce GTX Titan GPU
- RNN Software: Torch7 (<a href="http://torch.ch/">http://github.com/billzorn/torch-rnn/tree/dev</a>
- RNN: 3-layer LSTM, 512 cells/layer, 40k training batches
- Thanks to Bill Zorn, U. Washington
- Also see "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Recurrent Neural Networks" <a href="http://karpathy.github.io/2015/05/21/rnn-effectiveness/">http://karpathy.github.io/2015/05/21/rnn-effectiveness/</a>





# Presenting **DeepPLDI**: The First PLDI paper written by an RNN

Excerpt: "This work are not a solution to separation logic since the system requires only symbolic execution to erroridy details of dynamically nested query hardware. We present a convenient alias analysis that attains a number of queries in a typedef style, the design of the stand-representation is the case that symmetric constructs can be applied and how to matter. For example, inductive properties to support table loads and analysis, a keyword assumption to the signature for FF across a dynamically computed list. Our language's defects by computing these points are synthesized ing a synthesis of the sizes and mutations fence in Section 3.2.1."


- **DeepPLDI**, 2016





#### Languages are Central to Disruption

- VisiCalc, 1979
- Visual Basic, 1991
- Java, 1991
- JavaScript, 1996






## And Computing is Central to Everything...





#### The Rapidly Expanding World of Computing







#### Three Examples

Public Health
Financial Stability
Cybersecurity












#### Detour: Is Code Really Dead?

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Third letter on sunspots (December 1612)







#### Honoring Automated Reasoning at Scale



Pioneering achievements
Changing math & science
Awards / recognition



## Formal Proof—The Four-Color Theorem

Georges Gonthier

#### Automation of Mathematical Induction as part of the History of Logic

J STROTHER MOORE
Dept. Computer Sci., Gates Dell C., 2317 Speedway,
The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78701
moore@cs.utexas.edu

CLAUS-PETER WIRTH
FB AI, Hochschule Harz, D-38855 Wernigerode, Germany
wirth@logic.at

SEKI Report SR-2013-02









Z3 wins 2015 ACM SIGPLAN Award





# Example: the Z3 SMT Solver Leonardo de Moura and Nikolaj Bjørner, MSR

De Moura, Leonardo, and Nikolaj Bjørner. "Z3: An efficient SMT solver. TACAS 2008

Many important problems can be expressed as a system of constraints in some logic

 $x^2 + y^2 < 1$  and xy > 0.1

 $x^2 + y^2 < 1 \text{ and } xy > 1$ 

sat,  $x = \frac{1}{8}, y = \frac{7}{8}$ 

unsat, Proof

Is execution path *P* feasible?

Is assertion X violated?

Solution/Model

Path Exploration

Program Verification

Z3 is a platform that many build on:

- 30,000 downloads
- 2800+ citations

Is Formula *F* Satisfiable?





#### SMT Solvers are already superhuman

Part of a **4-megabyte** Z3 input generated in the proof of a verified TLS implementation (courtesy of Nikhil Swamy)







What does all this have to do with **Public Health**?





#### Public Health meets Formal Methods

#### What does this...



### Zika outbreak fuelled by mosquito control failure, says WHO boss

O 23 May 2016 Health



...have to do with this?





It starts with a question...

What if you could use mosquitos as sensors to detect the presence of infectious disease around the globe?





#### Building a Better Mosquito Trap



CO2-baited CDC UV trap, circa 2015



Premonition trap, 2016





#### Internet of (Field Biology) Things: Premonition



Analysis identifies Infectious diseases





DNA samples sent to cloud

Drone identifies placement sites





Mosquito trap located in likely spots






## Microsoft Research Safe Cyber-Physical Systems Expedition

High-level Planning

**Correct Control** 

**Robust Sensing** 

Secure OS



Safe despite limited power, external disturbances, sensor noise and complex missions





#### Automated Reasoning at Scale is Transformative

Enabling rapid advances in sciences based on:

Exponential improvements in sensing + devices

Cloud computing

Statistical and logical reasoning at scale

The future looks bright!





## Financial Stability

Increasingly, society depends on correct and efficient analysis of data

It all started with spreadsheets...








#### Aside: Code, Data, and Noise

- Programming languages people like to think about code
- Consider Niklaus Wirth:

Algorithms + Data Structures = Programs

Wrong!




Programs = Algorithms + Data Structures + **Data** 





Garbage in, garbage out is not the complete story

More reasoning required







#### Code and Data Always Coexist...

Question (too easy): consider this regular expression

```
([a-z0-9][-a-z0-9_\+\.]*[a-z0-9])@([a-z0-9][-a-z0-9\.]*[a-z0-9]\. (arpa|root|aero|biz|cat|com|coop|edu|gov|info|int|jobs|mi|mobi|museum|name|net|org|pro|tel|travel|ac|...) |([0-9]{1,3}\.{3}[0-9]{1,3}))
```

- What does it do?
- Here's a hint: benzorn@acm.org





# Programming by example combines (implicit) code and data directly

In the PowerShell ConvertFrom-String commandlet:

{username\*:benzorn}@{domain\*:acm.org}

generates a program that generalizes to extract the user and domain name from every row of an input file

See: "Spreadsheet Data Manipulation using Examples", CACM 2012, Research Highlights Paper, Sumit Gulwani, William Harris, Rishabh Singh and

https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/2014/10/31/convertfrom-string-example-basedtext-parsing/





## Spreadsheets combine data and code in novel and innovative ways

From: Fisher, Marc, and Gregg Rothermel. "The EUSES spreadsheet corpus..." ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes. Vol. 30. No. 4. ACM, 2005.

4	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Н	1	J	K	L	M
1	Annex 5.1	Fina	l tabl	e: Hi	storio	cal tr	ends	in fo	rest	reso	urce	s	
2 3 4	Forest area (1000 h	na)											
5		value	year	value	year	value	year	value	year	value	year	value	yea
6 7	Albania	1,000	1950	930	1981	910	1990	902	1995				
8	Austria	3,139	1951	3,177	1955	3,166	1960	3,230	1967	3,165	1977	3,330	1989
9	Belgium	541	1947	601	1950	588	1962	600	1970	620	1980	639	1997
0	Bulgaria	2,964	1947	3,259	1958	3,200	1970	3,300	1980	3,222	1990	3,124	1995
1	Czech Republic	2,416	1950	2503	1960	2,410	1970	2505	1980	2,552	1990	2486	200
2	Denmark	348	1947	436	1950	374	1960	373	1965	466	1979	400	198
3	Finland	20,700	1938	21,874	1952	21,057	1959	22,500	1968	23,225	1979	23,373	1986
4	France	10,954	1947	11,307	1953	11,500	1958	11,000	1959	13,090	1970	13,340	1981
5	Germany	7,548	1947	9,558	1952	9,996	1958	9,616	1963	9,428	1968	9,800	1970
6	Greece	500	1947	2,000	1953	1,976	1958	1,992	1963	2,289	1964	2,300	1970
7	Hungary	1,107	1947	1,253	1950	1,232	1958	1,214	1963	1,466	1970	1,563	1981
18	Ireland	89	1947	124	1951	145	1958	171	1962	268	1970	347	1980
19	Italy	5.900	1940	5.625	1950	5.826	1960	6.162	1970	6.363	1980	6.760	1990





### Spreadsheets Have Bugs, Often About Money

## Is This Spreadsheet a Tax Evader? How H. M. Customs & Excise Test Spreadsheet Applications

Raymond J Butler, CISA:

H. M. Customs and Excise, Ralli Quays, 3 Stanley Street, Salford, M60 9LA UK <a href="mailto:rbutler.c&e.cau@gtnet.gov.uk">rbutler.c&e.cau@gtnet.gov.uk</a> / <a href="mailto:ray.butler@hmce.gov.uk">ray.butler@hmce.gov.uk</a> ©Crown Copyright reserved, published by permission of the Commissioners of H M Customs & Excise

#### Findings:

- 7 files, 21 worksheets examined
- Average 713 formulas/file
- Total taxes: 12M pounds
- Total error: 1.37M pounds = 11% of total





#### Sometimes the Errors are Significant



2012 trading activities of a single individual at JP Morgan resulted in a total loss estimated at

\$6.2 billion

The actual problem in the Whale's spreadsheet:

"After subtracting the old rate from the new rate, the spreadsheet **divided by their sum instead of their average**, as the modeler had intended. This error likely had the effect of muting volatility by a factor of two and of lowering the VaR . . ."





# Important Policies Are Based on Incorrect Computation



events blog about FDR library co
PROJECTS INSIGHTS ROOSEVELTER

**NEXT NEW DEAL: THE BLOG OF THE ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE** 

**ECONOMY AND GROWTH, RORTYBOMB** 

Researchers Finally Replicated Reinhart-Rogoff, and There Are Serious Problems.

By Mike Konczal | 04.16.13

Used by economists to justify austerity policy

Based on faulty calculations in the spreadsheet

http://rooseveltinstitute.org/researchers-finally-replicated-reinhart-rogoff-and-there-are-serious-problems/






### Inside Reinhart-Rogoff

					Real GDP growth						
			D	ebt/GDP		Debt/GDP					
Coverage	Total	30 or less	30 to 60	60 to 90	90 or above	30 or less	30 to 60	60 to 90	90 or a		
1791-2009		129	59	23	5	4.02099797756343	3.42285727458613	3.26406756046117	-1.8151		
1830-2009		3	68	27	82	2.53381807093758	2.21396433936988	2.07237886235964	1.80469		
1880-2009		79	40	11	0	2.91802819692192	2.86025681953054	2.66582383238736			
1850-2009		26	53	47	30	1.5933244354603	3.18706387741504	1.29386323254985	2.80469		
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1880-2009		17	50	32	8	4.08261358545019	2.8319405911495	2.35009357783615	2.00941		
1885-2009		47	42	11	11	4.94889741153636	3.7178925579162	3.88479257818286	0.68725		
1880-2009		26	12	39	49	5.35263165338344	4.93890175331293	1.86680970618687	0.68574		
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1835-2009		37	60	32	31	2.95628925515421	2.59200241233773	2.0976137405758	3.26219		
1880-2009		43	32	35	0	4.30558940335994	2.99136331961633	2.34102334597052			
1902-2009		38	33	23	8	3.14160853067272	4.13710606493654	2.29146668819559	4.59650		
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#### Where are Formulas Expected?







#### Spreadsheet Tools Still Underinvested in PL

#### Correctness advances

- Spreadsheet smells [Hermans et al., ICSM 2012]
- Data debugging / CheckCell [Barowy et al., OOPSLA 2014]
- Cell clustering / Custodes [Cheung et al., ICSE 2016]

#### **Productivity advances**

- Excel 2013 Flash Fill [Gulwani POPL 2011]
- Table extraction / FlashRelate [Barowy et al., PLDI 2015]
- BlinkFill [Singh VLDB 2016]





#### Correctness Beyond Spreadsheets



Recode Sept. 10 2014 <a href="http://on.recode.net/1svpE2a">http://on.recode.net/1svpE2a</a>

How many financial decisions are now based on technology that we don't understand and is likely to have bugs?

April 25, 2013 - 1:36 PM PDT

f 💆 🥕

Bloomberg April 25, 2013 <a href="http://bloom.bg/1Y79MPb">http://bloom.bg/1Y79MPb</a>





#### Reasoning about Code + Data

Combining code with data is powerful:

Spreadsheets

HTML + JavaScript + CSS

Reasoning about data is as important as code Tools for such systems are relatively immature Much is at stake






Trust and Security







## Recall: Rapidly Expanding World of Computing







# Toyota Hires All-Star Team for Robotics and Artificial Intelli Towards the social media enabled jet engine

by Jason Si



Observation:
Every company is a software company



Monsanto Is Using Big Data to Take Over the World

The GMO giant wants to help you beat climate change...with your phone.

—By Tim McDonnell | Wed Nov. 19, 2014 6:00 AM EST







Yes, this is a computer too



**Amazon** Echo



Ring.com







Nest Zorn, PLDI 2016







## Implications of CS + X

How much does your life depend on correct software?

What's the trend?

Can governments understanding or regulate this trend?

When do you start worrying?








#### One Trend: Ransomware

Percentage of FireEye NX and EX Appliances Sharing Information with FireEye Dynamic Threat Intelligence Detecting Ransomware



Businesses and individuals increasingly targeted by ransomware

Dramatic increases in 2016





## Smart Everything Increases the Attack Surface

I BOUGHT SOME AWFUL LIGHT BULBS SO YOU DON'T HAVE TO

I maintain an application for bridging various non-Hue lighting enough like a Hue that an Amazon Echo will still control them was colour support, so I picked up some cheap bulbs and a bri iRainbow001, and it's terrible.

Mathew Garrett Blog, Feb. 2016 https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/40397.html Findings:

Trivial credentials
No encryption
Easy to crash
No longer supported





### Did I Mention Companies Cheat?

Exp MIT Technology Review

gen's Emissions Scandal

DIRECTLY and DEDEV WATVING HIDDATED home 1 0010



CLE

Volkswage used to chea



A View from David Zax

You can hide a lot in 100M lines of code

Many Cars Have a Hundred Million Lines of Code

Who gets to write it?

December 3, 2012

MIT Technology Review, Dec. 3, 2012 <a href="http://bit.ly/24xwGiH">http://bit.ly/24xwGiH</a>







Sounds really hard...





## Required: Adversarial Thinking for All Engineers

Sokwoo Rhee (AD CPS, NIST): "How would you have prevented StuxNet?"

- Computer scientist: "Reduce attack surface, limit access, ..."
- Mechanical eng.: "Install a limit switch on the centrifuges."







## Trust, but Verify

#### UL Launches Cybersecurity Assurance Program

New UL 2900 Series of Standards Offer Testable Cybersecurity Criteria for Network-Connectable Products & Systems

http://www.ul.com/cybersecurity

Emphasis on up-to-date patches, testing methods, code analysis, crypto

Do we really know how to provide "cybersecurity assurance"? How assured are you?





# Can we really verify? Two Expeditions: DeepSpec and Everest

Scalable reasoning meets software verification at scale



DeepSpec is an Expedition in Computing funded by the National Science Foundation.

We focus on the specification and verification of full functional correctness of software and hardware.

http://deepspec.org/

\$10M NSF Expedition in Computing Awarded 2016





#### Everest Expedition: Microsoft Research

Goal: drop-in verified HTTPS replacement


**Challenges:** 

- scalability of verification

- performance

- usable tool chain







Slide courtesy of Cedric Fournet

Zorn, PLDI 2016



# Is Software the Hero or the Villain?





## Disruptions are Happening

- Smart objects will replace dumb objects
- The software embedded in this objects
   will be written in the next 5 years, but
   will have implications for the next 50 years
- Our lives will depend on these objects...
- We need languages, tools, and processes to make these objects safe





## The Cathedral and the Skyscraper



Heroic effort, amazing engineering, one of a kind...




Stronger materials, reusable components, mathematical analysis...





#### Building the Skyscraper: Key Elements

#### Reasoning at scale




Assuming cyber-physical systems



#### Understanding code and data



#### Requiring verified components







## Thank you!

#### Acknowledgements

Daniel Barowy, Emery Berger, Nikolaj Bjorner, Shabnam Erfani, Cedric Fournet, Sumit Gulwani, Ethan Jackson, Ed Lazowska, Daan Leijen, Jonathan Protzenko, Sokwoo Rhee, Rishabh Singh, Nikhil Swamy, Emma Tosch, Moshe Vardi, Jeannette Wing, Bill Zorn, Sue Zorn, members of the CCC, MSR Safe CPS Expedition, MSR Everest Expedition

Follow me: @benzorn https://twitter.com/benzorn

**DeepPLDI**: In order to guarantee termination of pairs defined via conversion and verification constraint from the valid-register files to termination and refinement types...






#### The Existential Threat of Al

Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and Bill Gates Warn About Artificial
Intelligence

The Observer, 8/19/2015 http://bit.ly/1Pcjf1s




Rapid rise of AI in robotics, vision, etc. raises concerns





#### The Existential Threat of Al Bad Software



From: http://blog.castsoftware.com/when-good-software-goes-bad/





#### The Existential Threat of Al Bad Software

- Al is always part of a complete SW system
- Real risk is not knowing what SW can or will do…but:

- Assuming an adversary is first step (bad actors)
- Testing is the traditional approach
- Testing might fail when input/output behaviors are sufficiently complex – this is a PL challenge





## Thank you!

#### Acknowledgements

Daniel Barowy, Emery Berger, Nikolaj Bjorner, Shabnam Erfani, Cedric Fournet, Sumit Gulwani, Ethan Jackson, Ed Lazowska, Daan Leijen, Jonathan Protzenko, Sokwoo Rhee, Rishabh Singh, Nikhil Swamy, Emma Tosch, Moshe Vardi, Jeannette Wing, Bill Zorn, Sue Zorn, members of the CCC, MSR Safe CPS Expedition, MSR Everest Expedition

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**DeepPLDI**: In order to guarantee termination of pairs defined via conversion and verification constraint from the valid-register files to termination and refinement types...

