

Security Principles

Security is a system requirement just like performance, capability, cost, etc.

Therefore, it may be necessary to trade off certain security requirements to gain others

Overview

- **Simplicity**
 - Less to go wrong
 - Fewer possible inconsistencies
 - Easy to understand
- **Restriction**
 - Minimize access
 - Inhibit communication

Design Principles for Protection Mechanisms

- Least privilege
- Economy of mechanism
- Complete mediation
- Open design
- Separation of privilege
- Least common mechanism
- Psychological acceptability
- Fail-safe defaults

Saltzer and Schroeder 1975

Least Privilege

- Should only have the rights necessary to complete your task.
- Default should be lack of access
- If access needed temporarily, then it should be rescinded right after use

Economy of Mechanism

- Sufficiently small and simple as to be verified and implemented
 - e.g., security kernel
- Simpler means less can go wrong
 - And when errors occur, they are easier to understand and fix

Economy of Mechanism (2)

- Complex mechanisms may not be correctly:
 - Understood
 - Modeled
 - Configured
 - Implemented
 - Used
- Keep it as simple as possible
 - KISS Principle

Complete Mediation

- Every access to every object must be checked
- Must be efficient
- In addition to normal runtime, must be done at:
 - initialization
 - shutdown
 - restart

Open Design

- Don't depend on secrecy of the design
- “Security through obscurity” is a bad idea
- Should be open for scrutiny by the community
- Better to have a friend/colleague find an error than a foe

Diebold Voting Machines

Inspection of the code by John Hopkins team found

- Passwords embedded in the source code
- Unauthorized privilege escalation and other vulnerabilities
- Incorrect use of cryptography
- Undetected, unlimited votes by voters
- Insider threats - company workers or election officials can alter voters' ballot choices without their knowledge

Separation of Privilege

- Access to objects should depend on more than one condition being satisfied
 - Separation of duty
 - Two person rule

Least Common Mechanism

- Minimize the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users
- Every shared mechanism is a potential information path

Psychological Acceptability

- User interface must be easy to use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the mechanisms correctly. Otherwise, they will be bypassed
- Security mechanisms should not add to difficulty of accessing resource

Fail-Safe Defaults

- The default is lack of access
- Need to argue why a user *should have* access. Do not argue why a user *should not have* access
- If action fails, system as secure as when action began

Principles for a Secure Design

- Design security in from the start
- Allow for future security enhancements
- Minimize and isolate security controls
- Employ least privilege
- Structure the security relevant features
- Make security friendly
- Don't depend on secrecy for security

Morrie Gasser 1988

To Make Security Friendly

- Security should not impact users who obey the rules
- It should be easy for users to give access
- It should be easy for users to restrict access
- Established defaults should be reasonable

Principles for Software Security

- Secure the weakest link
- Practice defense in depth
- Fail securely
- Follow the principle of least privilege
- Compartmentalize
- Keep it simple
- Promote privacy
- Remember that hiding secrets is hard
- Be reluctant to trust
- Use your community resources

Viega and McGraw 2001

Secure the Weakest Link

- A software security system is only as strong as its weakest link
- Attackers go after the easy targets
 - they will go after endpoints rather than trying to crack encryption
 - they will attempt to crack an application visible through the firewall rather than firewall itself
- Identify and strengthen weak links until an acceptable level of risk is achieved

Practice Defense in Depth

- Use diverse defensive strategies
- If one layer turns out to be inadequate, another layer will hopefully prevent a complete compromise
 - firewall to protect subnet, but sensitive information on the subnet is encrypted
- DoD Eligible Receiver experience 1997

Fail Securely

- If your software has to fail, make sure it does it securely

Follow the Principle of Least Privilege

- Only the minimum amount of access necessary to perform an operation should be granted, and that access should be granted only for the minimum amount of time necessary

Compartmentalize

- Basic access building block is not all or nothing
- Minimize the amount of damage that can be done by breaking the system into units
- Very few operating systems do this because it is difficult to manage
- Root privilege is an example of how not to do it

Keep it Simple

- Complex design is never easy to understand

Promote Privacy

- Try not to do anything that compromises the privacy of the user
- Often trades off against usability
 - System should forget credit card numbers
 - Users hate having to type it in each time
- Should extend to systems and code
 - No reason to give out any more information than necessary (e.g., os name and version)

Remember that Hiding Secrets is Hard

- Skilled youth can circumvent any protection that a company tries to hardcode into their software (e.g., DVD viewers)
- Binaries can be reverse engineered

Be Reluctant to Trust

- Instead of making assumptions that need to hold true, you should be reluctant to extend trust
- How can any COTS component be trusted to be secure?
- Just because a particular security feature is an emerging standard doesn't mean it actually makes sense
- Sometimes it is prudent not to trust yourself

Use Your Community Resources

- Repeated use without failure promotes trust
- Public scrutiny promotes trust