An Empirical Study of Collusion Behavior in the Maze P2P File-Sharing System
Qiao Lian
Zheng Zhang
Mao Yang
Ben Y. Zhao
Yafei Dai
Xiaoming Li
The 27th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2007)
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Paper Abstract
Peer-to-peer networks often use incentive policies to encourage cooperation
between nodes. Such systems are generally susceptible to collusion by
groups of users in order to gain unfair advantages over others. While
techniques have been proposed to combat web spam collusion, there are few
measurements of real collusion in deployed systems. In this paper, we
report analysis and measurement results of user collusion in Maze, a
large-scale peer-to-peer file sharing system with a non-net-zero
point-based incentive policy. We search for colluding behavior by examining
complete user logs, and incrementally refine a set of collusion detectors
to identify common collusion patterns. We find collusion patterns similar
to those found in web spamming. We evaluate how proposed reputation systems
would perform on the Maze system. Our results can help guide the design of
more robust incentive schemes.